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NOTES
ESTATE PLANNING THROUGH MARITAL DEDUCTION
EQUALIZATION CLAUSES
Since enactment of the federal estate tax marital deduction in 1948,'
estate planners have explored numerous methods of utilizing the mari-
tal deduction to minimize married couples' estate taxes. Several com-
mentators have advocated the use of marital deduction equalization
clauses.' In three recent cases3 the Internal Revenue Service chal-
lenged marital bequests4 effected through such clauses, asserting that
the interests created failed to satisfy the deductibility requirements of
section 2056.1 The Tax Court, however, upheld the validity of each
equalization clause bequest and thus allowed the claimed marital de-
duction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court judgment in the
only case yet decided at the appellate level.6
Part I of this Note presents an overview of the estate tax marital de-
duction provisions, with special attention to the terminable interest lim-
itations.7 Part II examines the judicial response to marital deduction
equalization clauses,8 while Part III presents a critical analysis of that
response.' Part IV explores the effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1976
on the marital deduction equalization clause as a planning technique
1. Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 471, 62 Stat. 110 (1948) (codified at I.R.C. § 2056).
2. See, e.g., A. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 1240 & n.128a (3d ed. 1961 & Supp. 1978);
Barnes. New Tax Court Decisions Broaden Estate Planning Potential of Marital Deduction, 45 J.
TAX. 292, 295 (1976); Kabaker, Drafting Post-1976 Marital Deduction Formula Clauses, in THE
TWELFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON ESTATE PLANNING 1210.1-.3 (U. Miami 1978); Note, Equali-
zation Clauses with Alternate Valuation: An Emerging Optionfor Estate Planners, 63 IowA L. REv.
486, 502-03 (1977).
3. Estate of Laurin v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 644, appeal docketed, No. 79-1606
(6th Cir. Oct. 30, 1979); Estate of Meeske v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 73, appeal docketed, No. 79-
1615 (6th Cir. Oct. 31, 1979); Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 415 (1976) (nonacq. 1978-1
C.B. 3), af'dper curiam, 565 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1977).
4. The term "marital bequest," as used in this Note, refers to any interspousal bequest in-
tended to qualify for the marital deduction.
5. See I.R.C. § 2056; notes 11-27 infra and accompanying text.
6. Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 565 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1977), afgper curiam, 66 T.C.
415 (1976), nonacq. 1978-1 C.B. 3.
7. See notes 11-34 infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 35-73 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 74-99 infra and accompanying text.
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and analyzes the alternatives available after the Revenue Act of 1978.10
I. MARITAL DEDUCTION: THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Section 2056"t of the Internal Revenue Code creates the estate tax
marital deduction. Congress enacted the marital deduction provision
in 194812 in an attempt to achieve uniform federal estate tax treatment
of married individuals in community property and common-law juris-
dictions.'3 Section 2056, as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1976,14
allows a deduction from a decedent's gross estate for the value of any
interest in noncommunity property 5 passing from the decedent to the
decedent's surviving spouse.' 6 The deduction is limited to $250,000 or
one-half of the adjusted gross estate,17 whichever is greater. t8 The in-
10. See notes 100-119 infra and accompanying text.
11. I.R.C. § 2056.
12. Pub. L. No. 471, 62 Stat. 110 (1948).
13. Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503, 510 (1964); United States v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118,
128 (1963); H.R. REP. No. 1274, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-26 (1948); S. REP. No. 1013 (Part 1), 80th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 26-29 (1948), reprinted in 1948-1 C.B. 288, 300-302.
Under a community property system only one-half of any community property is includible in
the estate of a decedent spouse because outright ownership of the other half vests in the surviving
spouse. Prior to enactment of the marital deduction provisions, estate tax burdens fell more heav-
ily on married couples in common-law jurisdictions, given the existence of progressive estate tax
rates and the fact that any property bequeathed by a decedent spouse to a surviving spouse would
have been fully includible and hence taxable in the estates of both spouses. Through enactment of
the marital deduction, Congress attempted to provide to couples in common-law jurisdictions the
same "estate-splitting" possibilities automatically available to couples in community property ju-
risdictions. United States v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118, 128 (1963).
14. Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 2002(a)(1), Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1854 (1976).
15. I.R.C. §§ 2056(c)(1)(C), (c)(2)(B).
16. Determination of the requisite legal relationship qualifying an individual as a decedent's
surviving spouse is sometimes a difficult matter, especially when one of the parties has received a
divorce decree which is later declared invalid by a jurisdiction other than the one granting the
original decree. Compare Estate of Spalding v. Commissioner, 537 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1976) with
Estate of Goldwater v. Commissioner, 539 F.2d 878 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1023 (1976)
and Estate of Steffke v. Commissioner, 538 F.2d 730 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1022 (1976).
See generally S. REP. No. 1013 (Part 2), 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1948), reprinted in 1948-1 C.B.
335. See also Eccles v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 1049, 1053 (1953), a 'dper curiam, 208 F.2d 796
(4th Cir. 1953).
17. I.R.C. § 2056(c)(2) defines the adjusted gross estate as the gross estate less the deductions
allowed by I.R.C. § 2053 (for funeral and administration expenses, and claims against the estate)
and I.R.C. § 2054 (for certain losses from casualty and theft). The section also provides for an
appropriate adjustment, in determining the amount of the adjusted gross estate, for the value of
community property held by the decedent. I.R.C. § 2056(c)(2)(B).
18. I.R.C. § 2056(c)(1)(A). The Code also provides an adjustment to the limitations placed
on the amount of the estate tax marital deduction, for the amount of any gift tax marital deduction
claimed by the decedent for lifetime gifts made by the decedent to the spouse. Id. § 2056(c)(1)(B).
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terest passing to the surviving spouse must be includible in the dece-
dent's gross estate to qualify for the marital deduction. 9
Section 2056(b), referred to as the "terminable interest rule,"20 estab-
lishes another major limitation on the marital deduction. Section
2056(b)(1) 21 denies the availability of the marital deduction for any in-
terest passing to the surviving spouse if the interest may terminate or
fail "on the lapse of time, on the occurrence of an event or contingency,
Notwithstanding this required adjustment, in certain instances appropriate planning for optimal
use of the gift tax and estate tax marital deductions can reduce aggregate transfer taxes (i.e., gift
taxes and estate taxes, combined) on transfers by an individual to his or her spouse. See, e.g.,
Allington, How Interspousal Gi/ts, Marital Deductions Shape Estate Taxes on Successive Estates, 48
J. TAx. 284 (1978).
Prior to amendment by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 2056(c) limited the maximum marital
deduction to one-half of the adjusted gross estate. The 1976 amendment revising the limitation to
the greater of $250,000 or one-half of the adjusted gross estate affects only estates under $500,000.
The 1976 Act also instituted the unified credit which provides for a credit against the estate tax
of up to $47,000 for estates of decedents dying after 1980. I.R.C. § 2010. The result of this provi-
sion is to make estates under $175,625 completely nontaxable regardless of any bequest intended
to qualify for the marital deduction. See notes 107-09 infra and accompanying text. Conse-
quently, the effect of any pre-1976 clause providing for a bequest to the surviving spouse equal in
amount to the maximum marital deduction should be carefully reconsidered in light of the 1976
changes.
19. I.R.C. § 2056(a) provides:
Allowance of Marital Deduction. For purposes of the tax imposed by section 2001, the
value of the taxable estate shall, except as limited by subsections (b) and (c), be deter-
mined by deducting from the value of the gross estate an amount equal to the value of
any interest in property which passes or has passed from the decedent to his surviving
spouse, but only to the extent that such interest is included in determining the value of
the gross estate.
20. See, e.g., Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503, 510 (1964); S. REP. No. 1013 (Part 2),
80th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1948), reprinted in 1948-1 C.B. 335.
21. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(1) states:
(b) Limitation in the Case of Life Estate or Other Terminable Interest.
(1) General Rule.-Where, on the lapse of time, on the occurrence of an event or
contingency, or on the failure of an event or contingency to occur, an interest passing to
the surviving spouse will terminate or fail, no deduction shall be allowed under this
section with respect to such interest-
(A) if an interest in such property passes or has passed (for less than an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth) from the decedent to any person other
than such surviving spouse (or the estate of such spouse); and
(B) if by reason of such passing such person (or his heirs or assigns) may possess or
enjoy any part of such property after such termination or failure of the interest so passing
to the surviving spouse; and no deduction shall be allowed with respect to such interest
(even if such deduction is not disallowed under subparagraphs (A) and (B))
(C) if such interest is to be acquired for the surviving spouse, pursuant to the direc-
tions of the decedent, by his executor or by the trustee of a trust. For purposes of this
paragraph, an interest shall not be considered as an interest which will terminate or fail
merely because it is the ownership of a bond, note, or similar contractual obligation, the
discharge of which would not have the effect of an annuity for life or for a term.
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or on the failure of an event or contingency to occur.""2 This limitation
applies, however, only if upon that termination or failure the interest in
the property passes from the decedent to a person other than the sur-
viving spouse, and as a result that person thereafter possesses or enjoys
any part of the property.23
The terminable interest rule is subject to several exceptions, the most
pertinent being section 2056(b)(5).24 That section provides that if an
interest in property passes from the decedent, and the surviving spouse
is entitled to all the income from that interest for life and receives a
general power of appointment over the interest, then the interest shall
be considered as passing to the surviving spouse and not to any other
22. Id.
23. Id. A few examples may help to illustrate the operation of the terminable interest rule.
Perhaps the most common form of terminable interest is the life estate in the surviving spouse. In
such a case the surviving spouse's life estate and hence her interest in the property necessarily
terminate on her death, and the remaindermen thereafter possess or enjoy the property. (If cou-
pled with a grant to the surviving spouse of a general power of appointment over the property, the
bequest of a life estate to a surviving spouse may nonetheless qualify for the marital deduction
under § 2056(b)(5). See notes 24-27 infra and accompanying text.).
Additional examples of terminable interests are bequests in the form "to my wife for a specified
term of years," "to my wife until she remarries," or "to my husband until he reaches age sixty-
five," with remainders over to others upon the occurrence of the contingency. S. REP. No. 1013
(Part 2), 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1948), reprinted in 1948-I C.B. 335.
A bequest of an interest in property such as a patent is not a nondeductible terminable interest
within the meaning of § 2056(b)(1). Even though the patent itself, and hence the surviving
spouse's interest therein, must necessarily terminate with the lapse of time, the interest in the
patent does not thereafter pass from the decedent to someone other than the surviving spouse.
If the decedent directs the executor to purchase a patent or a similar interest for distribution to
the surviving spouse, however, the interest will not qualify for the marital deduction. I.R.C.
§ 2056(b)(1)(C). See note 21 spra.
24. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5) states:
(5) Lpfe Estate with Power of Appointment in Surviving Spouse.-In the case of an
interest in property passing from the decedent, if his surviving spouse is entitled for life
to all the income from the entire interest, or all the income from a specific portion
thereof, payable annually or at more frequent intervals, with power in the surviving
spouse to appoint the entire interest, or such specific portion (exercisable in favor of such
surviving spouse, or of the estate of such surviving spouse, or in favor of either, whether
or not in each case the power is exercisable in favor of others), and with no power in any
other person to appoint any part of the interest, or such specific portion, to any person
other than the surviving spouse-
(A) the interest or such portion thereof so passing shall, for purposes of subsection
(a), be considered as passing to the surviving spouse, and
(B) no part of the interest so passing shall, for purposes of paragraph (1)(A), be con-
sidered as passing to any person other than the surviving spouse. This Paragraph shall
apply only if such power in the surviving spouse to appoint the entire interest, or such
specific portion thereof, whether exercisable by will or during life, is exercisable by such
spouse alone and in all events.
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person.2" Thus, although every life estate is inherently terminable,26
the effect of section 2056(b)(5) is to allow the marital deduction for
certain qualifying life estates by removing them from the operation of
the terminable interest rule.27
Estate planners often can integrate married couples' dispositive
wishes with appropriate marital deduction planning to achieve signifi-
cant estate tax savings. A primary goal of marital deduction planning
is to prevent double estate taxation of property held by a married
couple. Marital deduction property, if not consumed prior to death, is
includible in the estate of the surviving spouse. Therefore, estate plan-
ners have developed numerous highly complex drafting arrangements
to insure that the surviving spouse receives no more than the amount of
property required to utilize the desired marital deduction.28 Any mari-
tal bequest in excess of this amount is subject to double estate taxation
because the property ultimately will be includible in both spouses' es-
tates without a deduction in either.2 9
The foremost technique employed by estate planners in providing for
the appropriate marital deduction bequest is the formula bequest. The
amount of property transferred to the surviving spouse under this tech-
nique is determined by a formula clause in the decedent's will.30 Prior
25. Id.
26. See S. REP. No. 1013 (Part 2), 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, 11 (1948), reprinted in 1948-1 C.B.
337, 338.
27. The other two exceptions to the terminable interest rule are set forth in I.R.C.
2056(b)(3) and 2056(b)(6).
Section 2056(b)(3) states that an interest passing to the surviving spouse shall not be considered
a terminable interest--and thus will qualify for the marital deduction-when the terminating con-
dition specified in the testamentary instrument is the death of the surviving spouse within six
months of the decedent's death, and the surviving spouse does not die within that period. For
example, a bequest to a surviving spouse which is made conditional on that spouse's surviving
decedent's death by a specified period will qualify for the marital deduction, provided the speci-
fied survival period does not exceed six months and the surviving spouse in fact lives the required
time.
Under § 2056(b)(6), if the interest in property passing from the decedent consists of the proceeds
of a life insurance, endowment, or annuity contract, and those proceeds are payable to the surviv-
ing spouse throughout her life, the interest will qualify for the marital deduction provided the
spouse also has a general power to appoint all amounts remaining to be paid (either after her
death, or merely after the exercise of the power).
28. U.S. Treasury Dept. House Ways and Means Comm. and Senate Finance CoMn, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., Tax Reform Studies and Proposals 357-58 (Comm. Print 1969).
29. Id.; R. CovEY, THE MARITAL DEDUCTION AND THE USE OF FORMULA PROVISIONS 1-3
(2d ed. 1978); ESTATE AND GIFT TAX AFTER TAX REFORM 125-27 (M. Weinberger ed. 1977).
30. A result generally equivalent to the use of a formula clause in a will can be achieved
through creation of a revocable inter vivos trust providing for division of the trust assets, on the
Washington University Open Scholarship
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to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, these formulae normally transferred to
the surviving spouse property equal to fifty percent of the decedent's
adjusted gross estate, which at that time represented the maximum
marital deduction.31 If the surviving spouse possessed a substantial in-
dependent estate, however, a formula providing for the maximum mar-
ital deduction bequest potentially caused the couple's aggregate estate
taxes to be greater than necessary,32 due to the progressive nature of
estate tax rates.33 In these circumstances, aggregate estate taxes might
be reduced through a formula clause providing for a marital bequest
equal only to the amount required to equalize the two estates.34
II. JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO EQUALIZATION CLAUSES
In Estate of Smith v. Commissioner3 the Tax Court undertook its
first consideration of the validity of an equalization clause for estate tax
marital deduction purposes. The decedent in Smith had created a rev-
ocable inter vivos trust which, at his death, contained the bulk of his
assets. 36 The trust instrument provided that if the decedent's wife sur-
vived him, upon his death the trust corpus was to be divided into two
portions, the "marital portion" and the "residual portion." The instru-
ment directed that the surviving spouse receive a life income interest in
and general testamentary power of appointment over the marital por-
settlor's death, according to the terms of a formula clause contained in the trust. See, e.g., Estate
of Smith v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 415, 417-18 (1976) (nonacq. 1978-1 C.B. 3), aj'd per curiam,
565 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1977).
31. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
32. See A. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING UNDER THE TAX REFoRM AcT oF 1976 131-33 (2d
ed. 1978).
33. See I.R.C. § 2001(c); note 34 infra.
34. Mathematically, estate equalization is a relatively simple procedure. The amount of the
marital bequest required to equalize the estates of a husband and wife is equal to one-half of the
difference between the values of the two estates. For example, assume husband has an adjusted
gross estate of $1,200,000 and wife has an adjusted gross estate of only $800,000. The difference
between the two estates is $400,000, so that the amount of the marital bequest by husband (the
party with the larger estate) necessary to equalize the two estates-at $1,000,000 each-is
$200,000.
In this example, the amount of the maximum marital deduction available to husband's estate is
$600,000 (50% of $1,200,000). If husband had made the maximum marital deduction bequest his
taxable estate would have been reduced to $600,000, while wife's estate would have been increased
to $1,400,000.
35. 66 T.C. 415 (1976) (nonacq. 1978-1 C.B. 3), a f'dper curiam, 565 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1977).
Judge Drennen authored the Tax Court opinion, which was reviewed by the full court. Judge
Irwin dissented, and Judge Tannenwald did not participate in the review.
36. 66 T.C. at 417.
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37tion.
The decedent's trust directed the trustee to allocate sufficient assets to
the marital portion to equalize the estates of decedent and his spouse.
To determine the size of the surviving spouse's estate, the trustee was to
assume that decedent's spouse died after him, but on the date of his
death. For the purpose of determining the amount of the equalization
bequest, the trust instrument directed the trustee to value both estates
as of the same date, that date being either the date of death or the
statutory alternate valuation date,3 8 whichever would result in the low-
est hypothetical estate tax on the estates of both decedent and his
wife.
39
37. Id. at 427.
38. At the time of the decedent's death in Smith (June 7, 1970), the estate tax alternate valua-
tion date was one year after the date of death. The alternate valuation date has since been
changed to six months after the date of death. Pub. L. No. 91-614, § 101(a), 84 Stat. 1836 (1970)
(amending I.R.C. § 2032).
The "estate" of the surviving spouse used in the equalization clause formula represented merely
the hypothetical estate of the surviving spouse, assuming she had died on the same date as dece-
dent. Consequently, any action actually taken by the surviving spouse after the date of decedent's
death with respect to the assets which she held individually could not affect the amount of the
marital bequest to be made through decedent's equalization clause. Even if the trustee elected to
use alternate valuation date values for the "estates" of decedent and surviving spouse, all the
assets comprising those estates on the date of death would have been included in the overall
valuation, regardless of any intervening changes in the actual composition of the estates.
39. 66 T.C. at 418. On the alternate valuation date the values of the estates of decedent and
his surviving spouse were both higher than their respective values on the date of decedent's death.
Consequently, in accordance with the trust instrument the trustee used the date of death values for
federal estate tax purposes, as well as for determining the amount of the marital bequest to be
made pursuant to the marital deduction equalization clause. Id. at 420.
The actual clause read as follows:
Article IV
Distribution
On Seltlor's Death-Upon the death of Settlor, if his wife, Alice M. Smith, survives him,
corpus (including additions, but excluding property added to or allocated to a separate
asset account by reason of having been added by one other than Settlor, or for any other
reason) shall be divided into portions, one of which shall be called the Marital Portion
and the other of which shall be called the Residual Portion.
(a) There shall first be allocated to the Residual Portion any asset or the proceeds of
any asset (or interest therein) with respect to which the marital deduction would not be
allowed if allocated to the Marital Portion.
(b) There shall then be allocated to the Marital Portion that percentage interest in
the balance of the assets constituting the trust estate which shall when taken together
with all other interests and property that qualify for the marital deduction and that pass
or shall have passed to Settlor's said wife under other provisions of this trust or other-
wise, obtain for Settlor's estate a marital deduction which would result in the lowest
Federal estate taxes in Settior's estate and Settlor's wife's estate, on the assumption Set-
tlor's wife died after him, but on the date of his death and that her estate were valued as
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The Commissioner disallowed the marital deduction in Smith on the
ground that the interest created was a terminable interest, nondeduct-
ible under section 2056(b)(1). The Commissioner argued that if the
trustee elected alternate valuation and the value of the survivor's estate
on that date equalled or exceeded the value of decedent's estate, then
the surviving spouse's interest in the trust estate would terminate be-
cause no trust assets would be allocated to the marital portion.40
Rather, the entire trust corpus would pass to the residual portion of the
trust and thereafter would be possessed or enjoyed by the residual ben-
eficiaries. Consequently, the surviving spouse's interest was a nonde-
ductible terminable interest under the terms of section 2056(b)(1). at
In an opinion by Judge Drennen, the Tax Court rejected the Com-
missioner's arguments and allowed the marital deduction for the assets
that actually passed into the marital trust under the equalization clause.
Judge Drennen reasoned that the surviving spouse received an interest
in the marital trust that vested indefeasibly on decedent's death. The
inability to value the interest at that particular time did not render it
terminable, because no subsequent event could divest the surviving
of the date 'on (and in the manner in) which Settlor's estate is valued for Federal estate
tax purposes; Settlor's purpose is to equalize, insofar as possible, his estate and her estate
for Federal estate tax purposes, based upon said assumptions.
(c) There shall finally be allocated to the Residual Portion the remaining percentage
interest in the balance of the assets constituting Settlor's estate.
(d) The percentage interest of the Marital and Residual portions shall be determined
and fixed by using asset values for all such purposes as finally established for Federal
estate tax purposes. In selecting a valuation date for the purpose of the Federal estate
tax, Settlor directs Trustee to select the date which will result in the greatest tax benefit to
Settlor's wife's and Settlor's estates, regardless of the effect this selection may have on the
amount provided by this Article for Settlor's wife.
Id. at 417-18.
40. The Commissioner's terminable interest argument is applicable only with respect to an
equalization clause allowing for alternate valuation of both estates in determining the amount of
the marital bequest. The potential for substantial variation in the value of the assets comprising
decedent's estate and the estate of the surviving spouse between date of death and the alternate
valuation date is the real contingency which opens up the possibility that the surviving spouse may
receive nothing whatsoever through the equalization clause bequests. It is this very contingency
that lies at the heart of the Commissioner's 2056(b)(1) argument. 66 T.C. at 427-28. If the equali-
zation clause had not conditioned the calculation of the marital bequest on potential alternate
valuation date values, both the Commissioner and the Tax Court apparently would agree that no
terminable interest had been created.
41. 66 T.C. at 421, 427-28. See also Covey, Estate, Gift andIncome Taxation-1974 Develop-
ments, in THE TWELFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON ESTATE PLANNING S 145 (U. Miami 1975) (full
reprint of I.R.S. National Office Technical Advice Memorandum issued with regard to the Smith
estate); Shop Talk: LAS. Explains Why Equalization Clause Bars Marital Deduction, 42 J. TAX.
254-55 (1975) (partial reprint of same I.R.S. National Office Technical Advice Memorandum).
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spouse of her interest in the marital portion of the trust.42 Trustee dis-
cretion played no part in determination of the interest's value because
no subsequent event could alter the basic components of the formula
creating the marital bequest.43
Judge Drennen also noted that the Internal Revenue Service had
never opposed a deduction for a formula bequest on the ground that it
created a nondeductible terminable interest.' He initially reasoned,
therefore, that an equalization clause bequest, being but one form of
formula bequest, likewise did not create a terminable interest.45 Fur-
thermore, alternate valuation is a statutory prerogative46 that does not
result in a normal formula bequest being considered a nondeductible
terminable interest. This result occurs even though alternate valuation
may affect the amount of the marital deduction47 and, consequently,
the amount of the marital bequest actually passing to the surviving
spouse under the formula bequest. Finally, because the surviving
spouse received a life income interest in the marital portion of the trust
with a general testamentary power of appointment over the corpus,
Judge Drennen concluded that the interest created must qualify under
2056(b)(5) for the marital deduction.48 Choosing to rely solely on the
42. 66 T.C. at 428.
43. Id. at 430.
44. Id. at 425. In several instances the Internal Revenue Service has implicitly accepted
formula bequests (though not equalization clause bequests) as qualifying for the marital deduc-
tion. See, e.g., Empire Trust Co. v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Rev. Rul. 74-
42, 1974-1 C.B. 281; Rev. Rul. 55-643, 1955-2 C.B. 386.
The Internal Revenue Service also has indicated that it will disallow the marital deduction with
respect to pecuniary formula bequests when either the dispositive instrument or applicable state
law allows the trustee or executor to fund the bequest with assets not fairly representative of the
general appreciation or depreciation of all estate assets occurring between the date of valuation for
federal estate tax purposes and the date of distribution (i.e., date of actual funding of the bequest).
See Rev. Proc. 64-19, 1964-1 C.B. 682. See also Estate of Hamelsky v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 741
(1972), nonacq. 1973-1 C.B. 2. In both Rev. Proc. 64-19 and Hamelsky the Internal Revenue
Service argued that a pecuniary formula bequest may constitute a nondeductible terminable inter-
est, and thus fail to qualify for the marital deduction, if the discretion afforded the fiduciary to
distribute depreciated assets to the surviving spouse may diminish or defeat the marital bequest.
The Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner's assertions in Hamelsky, but found them inappo-
site in that case. Even though the trust instrument did not prohibit the trustee from distributing
depreciated assets to the spouse only, the court found that under state law the trustee did not have
discretion to do so.
45. 66 T.C. at 425.
46. I.R.C. § 2032.
47. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-4 (1958).
48. 66 T.C. at 427, 429.
Washington University Open Scholarship
870 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
terminable interest argument,49 the Commissioner apparently failed to
contest the apparent applicability of 2056(b)(5).50
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court judg-
ment in Smith.5" The appellate court decision disregarded Judge Dren-
nen's reasoning that the surviving spouse's interest in the marital
portion of the trust qualified for the marital deduction because it fell
squarely within the protective provisions of section 2056(b)(5). Instead,
the Seventh Circuit opinion focused on the basic policies underlying
the marital deduction, and upheld the Smith marital bequest as consis-
tent with the fundamental purposes of that provision. Quoting from
Northeastern Pennsylvania Bank & Trust Co. v. United States,52 the
court noted that it was "Congress' intent to afford a liberal 'estate-split-
ting' possibility to married couples."53 Furthermore, any assets ulti-
mately allocable to the marital portion of the trust eventually would be
taxable in the survivor's estate. 4 The court concluded, therefore, that
the equalization clause bequest qualified for the marital deduction even
if the statutory language of 2056(b)(1) could be read to indicate other-
wise.
Relying on the Tax Court theory that the potential terminable value
of an interest in a portion of a trust does not constitute a terminable
interest, the appellate court also found the Smith interest nontermin-
able under the literal language of section 2056(b)(1).1 6 The court de-
clared inapplicable Justice White's statement in Jackson v. United
States"7 that "there is no provision in the Code for deducting all termi-
nable interests which become nonterminable at a later date and there-
fore taxable in the estate of the surviving spouse if not consumed or
49. See notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text.
50. 66 T.C. at 427.
51. 565 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1977), aff'gper curiam, 66 T.C. 415 (1976), nonacq. 1978-1 C.B. 3.
52. 387 U.S. 213 (1967).
53. Id. at 221.
54. 565 F.2d at 458-59.
55. Id. at 459.
56. Id.
57. 376 U.S. 503 (1964). In Jackson the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether
the monthly allowance provided by California law for support of a widow during the administra-
tion of her husband's estate (and payable out of that estate) is a terminable interest. Under appli-
cable state law, the right to the allowance was not vested, but accrued only on the court order
providing for the payments. Furthermore, the widow's rights to ordered payments abated on her
death or remarriage. Id. at 506-07. Even though the estate had actually paid the widow $72,000,
the Court found that the widow's allowance constituted a nondeductible terminable interest.
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transferred, ' 58 on the ground that Jackson applied only where state law
had clearly declared an interest to be terminable.59' In Smith state
courts had never considered the nature of the interest at issue. Because
the interest had not been declared either terminable or nonvested at the
date of settlor's death,' "no vagary of state law" 61 precluded a federal
court from granting the marital deduction with respect to that inter-
est.62
In two recent cases, Estate of Meeske v. Commissioner63 and Estate of
Laurin v. Commissioner," the Internal Revenue Service again chal-
lenged marital deduction equalization clauses virtually identical to the
one in Smith. Relying entirely on Smith, the Tax Court again rejected
the Commissioner's section 2056(b)(1) objections.65
The Commissioner also asserted a new ground for disallowance of
the Meeske marital deduction, which had not been presented in Smith,
claiming that the marital trust failed to meet all the requirements of
2056(b)(5). 6 6 In particular, the Commissioner argued that the surviving
spouse did not have a right to income from or a power of appointment
over a "specific portion" of the decedent's revocable trust estate.67 Fur-
thermore, the Commissioner asserted that the surviving spouse lacked
the ability to effectively exercise her general testamentary power of ap-
58. Id. at 509-10.
59. 565 F.2d at 460.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. The Seventh Circuit's reliance on the absence of any state law determination of the
nature of the interest involved is highly questionable at best, especially in view of the Supreme
Court directive in Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967). In that case the Supreme
Court directed that when federal tax results turn on state law, federal courts themselves must
decide the proper application of pertinent state law, absent a decision on the point by the state's
highest court.
The basis of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Smith (as well as the basis of the Tax Court
decision in the same regard) with respect to the vested and indefeasible character of the surviving
spouse's interest in the marital portion of the trust is unclear. The Seventh Circuit may be decid-
ing implicitly that, if presented with the question, the highest court of the state of the trust admin-
istration (Michigan) would declare the interest to be indefeasibly vested at decedent's death. With
greater likelihood, the court may be declaring that, at least in the instant case, determination of
the characterization of the interest under state law is simply irrelevant for purposes of
§ 2056(b)(1). See 565 F.2d at 458 n.5.
63. 72 T.C. 73, appeal docketed, No. 79-1615 (6th Cir. Oct. 31, 1979).
64. 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 644, appeal docketed, No. 79-1606 (6th Cir. Oct. 30, 1979).
65. 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 645-46; 72 T.C. at 77.
66. 72 T.C. at 77-80. See notes 48-50 supra and accompanying text.
67. 72 T.C. at 79. See I.R.C. § 2056(bX5).
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pointment before the trust assets had been allocated to the marital por-
tion. The trust, therefore, failed to comply with the section 2056(b)(5)
requirement that the power be exercisable in all events. 68
The Tax Court rejected both arguments, holding that the trust did
meet the 2056(b)(5) prerequisites and thus qualified for the marital de-
duction. The court found that the surviving spouse had a life income
interest in and a power of appointment over a "specific portion" of the
decedent's trust estate, although the fractional amount of that portion
could not be determined absolutely until the alternate valuation date.
The court also found the surviving spouse's testamentary power of ap-
pointment to be exercisable in all events, beginning immediately upon
decedent's death. Even though the survivor might not know the value
of the interest over which she had the power, any testamentary exercise
of the power prior to: the arrival of the alternate valuation date would
be effective as to the entire amount allocable to the marital trust.6 9
The decedent in Estate of Laurin v. Commissioner7' also created a
revocable inter vivos trust that included a marital deduction equaliza-
tion clause. The clause was virtually identical to the clause utilized in
Smith, but the disposition of the marital portion of the trust estate dif-
fered significantly from that of either Smith or Meeske. In each of the
latter cases the trust instrument provided the surviving spouse with a
life interest in and general testamentary power of appointment over the
marital portion. In Laurin, however, the trust instrument directed the
trustee to distribute the assets comprising the marital portion to a revo-
cable trust created by the surviving spouse.7'
In a cryptic memorandum opinion based completely on Smith, the
Tax Court found that the Laurin bequest also created a qualifying in-
terest, nonterminable under the provisions of section 2056(b)(1). 72 The
court reached this result without well-reasoned analysis, even though
the outright bequest in Laurin differed significantly from the 2056(b)(5)
trust of Smith.73
68. 72 T.C. at 80.
69. Id. at 79-80.
70. 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 644, afppealdocketed, No. 79-1606 (6th Cir. Oct. 30, 1979).
71. Id . at 645.
72. Id. at 646.
73. Because Laurin involved an interest equivalent to an outright bequest rather than a be-
quest into a 2056(b)(5) trust, the factual setting of the case presented an excellent opportunity for
the court to review its Smith decision on the 2056(b)(1) terminability issues, uninhibited by any
[Vol. 58:861
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III. JUDICIAL RESPONSE: A CRITIQUE
The three equalization clause cases illustrate that equalization clause
bequests present potential questions of nondeductibility under the pro-
visions of both sections 2056(b)(1) and 2056(b)(5). The 2056(b)(5) is-
sues may be examined by a review of the Mfeeske decision, and the
2056(b)(1) issues will be analyzed thereafter.74
The marital trust in Meeske, once funded, undoubtedly complied
with the requirements of section 2056(b)(5). The Tax Court found the
surviving spouse's general testamentary power of appointment to be
exercisable in all events,75 and the trust instrument itself imposed no
limitations on the exercise of the power.7 6 Furthermore, even though
the widow may not know the value of the trust estate to be received and
though any disposition by the survivor may be delayed during the pe-
riod of administration of the decedent's estate, these factors alone do
not indicate that the power is not exercisable in all events."
Similarly, the survivor's income interest and general power of ap-
pointment over the marital trust in Aeeske appear to meet the "specific
portion" requirement of the statute78 because the decedent's trust in-
strument prescribes absolutely and with specificity the method of deter-
mining the spouse's portion. Consequently, the Tax Court in Meeske
correctly concluded that, once funded, the trust met the requirements
potential § 2056(b)(5) confusion which may have been present in Smith and Meeske. See notes
81-86 infra and accompanying text.
The stance taken by the parties in Laurin, however, arguably repressed complete review of
Smith. Meeske and Laurin were companion cases, and the same counsel represented the parties
in both cases. 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 646 n.2. Notwithstanding the material differences between the
two cases (see text accompanying notes 70-73 supra) the parties submitted briefs for Laurin identi-
cal to those for Meeske, including 2056(b)(5) arguments. Failing to find a 2056(b)(5) trust in
Laurin, the court ordered additional briefs. In response, the parties merely stipulated that the
Laurin distribution was equivalent to an outright bequest, apparently without further briefing of
the varying issues thereby presented. 38 T.C.M. (CCH) at 646 n.2.
74. See notes 80-99 infra and accompanying text.
75. The fact that the surviving spouse could exercise the general power of appointment only
by will did not prevent the power from being exercisable in all events, because I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5)
applies to general powers of appointment "whether exercisable by will or during life." I.R.C.
§ 2056(b)(5). See also Mittleman's Estate v. Commissioner, 522 F.2d 132 (D.D.C. 1975); Treas.
Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(g)(l) (1958).
76. See 72 T.C. at 76.
77. See Estate of Benjamin v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 598 (1965); Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-
5(g)( 4) (1958).
78. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5).
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of section 2056(b)(5).79
A bequest into a trust which by its terms meets the requirements of
section 2056(b)(5) may nonetheless fail to qualify for the estate tax
marital deduction.8" If the trust corpus, for example, consists of prop-
erty interests that are themselves terminable under section 2056(b)(l), 81
then the bequest of those interests into the 2056(b)(1) trust is nonde-
ductible.82 Furthermore, if a decedent has made a bequest intended to
fund a 2056(b)(5) trust, even though the asset bequeathed is not inher-
ently terminable, a proper interpretation of section 2056(b)(1) man-
dates a conclusion that the bequest still may fail to qualify for the
marital deduction. This result occurs if the surviving spouse's interest
in that asset is potentially terminable under section 2056(b)(1), accord-
ing to the manner in which that interest is created and restricted by the
terms of the decedent spouse's dispositive instrument.8
3
79. By implication, therefore, the Tax Court in Smith also correctly reasoned that the marital
trust in that case, with terms basically identical to those of the Meeske trust, complied with the
2056(b)(5) requirements. The Smith court apparently reached that conclusion without benefit of
briefs or argument by the parties on that point. 66 T.C. at 427.
80. See S. REP. No. 1013 (Part 2), 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-18, reprintedin 1948-1 C.B. 342-43,
which states,
[Paragraph (5) of section 2056(b)] also provides an exception to the terminable interest
provisions of [2056(b)(1)]. This exception is for the purpose of allowing the marital de-
duction in the case of certain trusts where the surviving spouse has a power of appoint-
ment. The other provisions of section /2056] are still applicable generally to interests
passing to the surviving spouse in trust.
Even though a trust meets all the tests of I206(b)(5)J, theprovisions of 12056(b)(1) and
(2)1 may disallow the marital deduction where the trust corpus consists, in whole or in
part, of terminable interests.
(emphasis added).
81. See S. REP. No. 1013 (Part 2), 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10, reprintedin 1948-1 C.B. 337-38
(Examples 1 & 2).
82. Id. The draftsmen of the Smith and Meeske marital trusts certainly recognized this fact,
providing that any of decedent's assets which of themselves would fail to qualify for the marital
deduction (presumably referring to assets which represent interests inherently terminable, see
notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text) must be allocated to the residual portion of the trust.
See note 39 supra. Thus, the only assets available for allocation to the marital trusts were those
which were not inherently terminable.
83. From a statutory viewpoint the need for a provision like 2056(b)(5) arises solely because
of the inherent terminability of life estates. Congress nevertheless wanted to allow the marital
deduction for bequests in trust when the surviving spouse receives a life income interest and a
general power of appointment over the trust corpus. In such a case, the spouse is the virtual owner
of the trust assets, entitled to all the income therefrom during life and freely able to direct their
disposition on death. See S. REP. No. 1013 (Part 2), 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1948-1
C.B. 342.
The only reason such an arrangement would not qualify for the marital deduction is that the
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The primary issue, therefore, is whether the Tax Court and the Sev-
enth Circuit rendered the proper decision in Smith, holding the interest
to be nonterminable under section 2056(b)(1), wholly apart from any
2056(b)(5) considerations. The principal Tax Court error in Smith was
its failure to recognize the absolute separability of the 2056(b)(1) and
2056(b)(5) issues. The Tax Court proceeded from the correct assump-
tion that the marital trust in Smith fulfilled the requirements of section
2056(b)(5), to the incorrect conclusion that the surviving spouse's inter-
est in that trust therefore qualified for the marital deduction. 4 As pre-
viously noted, the Code provides a marital deduction for interests in
property, not interests in trust. Where the interest in property is to be
held in a 2056(b)(5) trust that may never be funded, then the interest in
property may never pass to the surviving spouse. Furthermore, should
the contingency occur which would result in nonfunding of the marital
trust,85 the assets potentially allocable to the marital trust would in-
stead pass into the residual trust to be enjoyed by the residual benefi-
ciaries, thereby meeting all the 2056(b)(1) tests of a nondeductible
terminable interest. 86
spouse's life income interest necessarily must terminate on death, and thereafter the property will
be possessed and enjoyed by persons other than the surviving spouse. Thus, because the sole need
and reason for the existence of § 2056(b)(5) arose because of the inherent terminability of all life
estates, § 2056(b)(5) should apply to protect only those interests that are terminable solely because
they are life estates. If an interest in trust is potentially" terminable for any reason other than its
character as a life estate, then 2056(b)(5) should not apply to preserve its deductibility in that
regard. Rather, the interest must be subjected to critical examination as to terminability under
§ 2056(b)(1). See also note 80 supra and accompanying text.
84. See 66 T.C. at 427, 429.
85. In the Smith and Meeske cases the contingency which would result in nonfunding of the
marital trust would occur if. (1) On the alternate valuation date the value of the surviving
spouse's "estate" exceeded that of decedent's, and (2) alternate valuation were chosen for federal
estate tax purposes, in accordance with the terms of the trust instruments involved.
86. A close reading of the Tax Court opinion in Smith reveals the extent of the court's erro-
neous reliance, in deciding the 2056(b)(1) issues, on the fact that the marital portion of the trust
met the requirements of § 2056(b)(5). The court found significant the fact that the form of the
arrangement in Smith was a revocable inter vivos trust that was to be divided according to the
equalization clause into a marital portion and a residual portion. In an attempt to assist the court
in focusing on the 205 6(b)(1) terminability issue rather than the 2056(b)(5) nature of the marital
trust, the Commissioner urged the Tax Court to analyze the transaction as though the equalization
clause created an outright bequest. 66 T.C. at 431-32. The Tax Court refused this suggestion,
noting that both the court and the Commissioner have recognized "a distinction between the divi-
sion of a trust into two parts and the termination of one trust followed by the creation of another."
d. at 432.
Although such a distinction may be appropriate in other circumstances, the distinction is inap-
propriate when deciding the terminability of an interest to be placed into a trust. Regardless of
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Because the interest created in Smith fulfills the 2056(b)(1) require-
ments for terminability, all the remaining arguments advanced by the
Tax Court for allowing the marital deduction are inapposite. The
Court's characterization of the interest as vested and indefeasible is not
only irrelevant but also highly questionable. Although several courts
have applied the term "indefeasibly vested" to nonterminable inter-
ests,87 the only relevant question is whether the interest is terminable
within the definition provided by section 2056(b)(1). 88
The Tax Court's distinction between the terminable value of an in-
terest in a trust and the interest's terminable character 89 fails to recog-
nize that section 2056 allows a deduction only for interests in property,
not mere interests in a trust that may or may not hold any assets.90
Undoubtedly an interest in property is not terminable merely because
the value of the property may fall to zero, making the property worth-
less. In such a case the survivor's interest in the property does not ter-
minate, but continues. In the Smith case, however, the survivor's entire
interest in the underlying trust property could terminate if, in accord-
whether a trust-already containing assets-is to be divided into two distinct portions or two
different trusts, the interest of the surviving spouse in the underlying assets is the same. To hold
otherwise clearly is an elevation of form over substance.
The Smith court's refusal to analyze the transaction as an outright bequest similarly demon-
strates the inappropriate reliance on Smith by the Tax Court in Laurin, a case involving an out-
right bequest made through an equalization clause. Even if Smith had been correctly decided, this
unreasoning extension of its holding is unfortunate. See notes 71-74 supra and accompanying
text.
87. See, e.g., Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503 (1964); United States v. Mappes, 318
F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1963); Berger v. United States, 285 F. Supp. 92 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Estate of
Gardner v. United States, 220 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Mo. 1963); Estate of Reynolds v. United States,
189 F. Supp. 548 (E.D. Mich. 1960); Estate of Landers v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 828 (1962).
88. See S. REP. No. 1013 (Part 2), 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1948-1 C.B. 336 ("[I]t is
immaterial whether the interest passing to the surviving spouse is considered as a vested interest
subject to divestment or as a contingent interest. [Section 2056(b)(1)] applies whether the terms of
the instrument or the theory of their application are conceived as creating a future interest which
may fail to ripen or vest or as creating a present interest which may terminate. ... ); notes 60-62
supra and accompanying text.
In Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503, 506 (1964), the Supreme Court noted that under
California law the interest at issue was not vested. See note 57 supra. The Court also stated that
the interest was not indefeasible. Although the Court's use of the terms "vested" and "indefeasi-
ble" may have misled later courts in applying § 2056(b)(1), the Jackson Court based its decision of
nondeductibility squarely on the requirements of § 2056(b)(1), and not on the terminology at-
tached to the interest by state courts. Furthermore, nothing in the opinion indicates that mere
characterization of an interest as vested and indefeasible will suffice to render the interest
nonterminable under the federal statute.
89. 66 T.C. at 428.
90. See I.R.C. § 2056(a).
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ance with the mandates of the equalization clause, no trust property
whatsoever is allocated to the marital portion of the trust. Conse-
quently, there might have been a termination not only of the value of
the spouse's interest in the marital trust, but also of her entire interest in
the underlying trust property. Section 2056 makes interests in property
the only relevant interests, thus requiring a conclusion as to terminabil-
ity contrary to that reached by the Tax Court.
Finally, the mere fact that alternate valuation is a statutory preroga-
tive9' does not imply that use of an equalization clause employing al-
ternate valuation of both spouses' "estates" is likewise a prerogative.92
Section 2032 allows alternate valuation, but only with respect to prop-
erty included in the decedent's gross estate.93 Although alternate valu-
ation by its very nature may cause an adjustment in the amount of the
marital deduction allowed, 94 adjustments based on factors other than
variation in the value of the decedent's gross estate fall outside the pur-
view of the alternate valuation prerogative.95
The practical effect of allowing equalization based on alternate valu-
ation also undermines the Seventh Circuit's policy arguments in favor
of its Smith affirmance. 96 The primary congressional purpose behind
the marital deduction provisions was to provide uniform estate tax
treatment for married couples in both community property and com-
mon-law jurisdictions.97 In community property states, the community
property division is based on date of death values without provision for
readjustment at a later date.9" In a common-law jurisdiction, under
Smith's validation of equalization with alternate valuation a married
91. Id. § 2032.
92. See S. REP. No. 1013 (Part 2), 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10, reprinted in 1948-1 C.B. 338,
stating:
In determining whether an interest in property is a terminable interest ... the situa-
tion is viewed as of the date of decedent's death....
The election of the executor to determine the value of the gross estate as of a date
subsequent to the decedent's death, as provided in section [2032] of the Code, does not
extend to such later date the time for determining the character of the interest passing to
the surviving spouse and its deductibility under [section 2056(b)(1)].
93. Id.
94. Because the maximum marital deduction in estates larger than $500,000 is limited to 50%
of the adjusted gross estate, any variation in the adjusted gross estate will effect the amount of the
maximum marital deduction. Treas. Reg. § 20.2032-1(g), T.D. 7238, 1973-1 C.B. 544, 549-50.
95. See id., which states, IN]o such adjustment may take into account any difference in
value due to... the occurrence or non-occurrence of a contingency."
96. See notes 51-55 supra and accompanying text.
97. See notes 12-13 supra and accompanying text.
98. Of course, for federal estate tax purposes the value of the decedent's share of community
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couple may accomplish the property division based on either date of
death valuation or alternate valuation, whichever is more beneficial.
Even assuming that Congress intended to afford a liberal estate split-
ting possibility to married couples in common-law states, 99 there is no
indication whatsoever that Congress intended to increase the relative
advantage of common-law estate splitting over that available to couples
in community property states.
IV. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
Various commentators have advocated the use of the marital deduc-
tion equalization clause as an excellent estate planning tool."° Several
factors indicate, however, that the risks associated with the marital de-
duction equalization clause greatly exceed the tax benefits available.
Even though three cases have upheld the validity of the marital de-
duction equalization clause, the statutory arguments against allowance
of the marital deduction in those cases are persuasive. The Commis-
sioner has issued a nonacquiescence to the Smith decision' 0' and thus
will continue to challenge the allowance of a marital deduction when
the bequest is generated through an equalization clause providing for
possible alternate valuation. 10 2
The estate and gift tax changes generated by the Tax Reform Act of
1976103 make estate planning through marital deduction equalization
clauses much more complicated. The 1976 Act provided for unification
of lifetime gifts and testamentary transfers into a single, unified transfer
tax base, subject to a unified progressive tax rate schedule." Further-
more, the Act also provided for the possibility that a decedent's estate
and hence the overall transfer tax base may be increased for purposes
of section 2056 by the amount of certain generation-skipping trans-
property may be determined either at the date of death or the alternate valuation date, under
§ 2032.
99. Northeastern Pa. Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 387 U.S. 213, 221 (1967).
100. See generally A. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 1240 & n.128a (3d ed. 1961 & Supp. 1978);
Barnes, supra note 2, at 295; Kabaker, supra note 2, at 11210.1-.3; Note, Equalization Clauses with
Alternate Valuation: An Emerging Optionfor Estate Planners, 63 IowA L. REv. 486, 502-03 (1977).
101. 1978-1 C.B. 3.
102. The Commissioner has filed appeals to the Meeske and Laurin decisions, both in the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Given his nonacquiescence to Smith, and his pursuit of appellate
review of Meeske and Laurin, the Commissioner probably will continue to aggressively challenge
equalization clauses with alternate valuation.
103. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1846 (1976).
104. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001(a)(l), 90 Stat. 1846 (1976) (amending I.R.C. § 2001).
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fers.'°5 Thus, to equalize the tax rates applicable to the decedent's and
surviving spouse's estates, the calculation of the marital bequest must
necessarily include the values of the respective estates and the amount
of any lifetime gifts and generation-skipping transfers included in the
transfer tax base. Although drafting an equalization clause providing
appropriately for all of the foregoing disparate factors is not impossi-
ble, the task is certainly more complicated than prior to the Tax Re-
form Act of 1976.
Even if a workable clause is conceived, careful consideration of the
actual tax results that occur through equalization indicates that abso-
lute equalization may result in no tax savings whatsoever, and might
even cause increased transfer taxes."° The Tax Reform Act of 1976
provided a unified credit against estate taxes of $47,000 for decedents
dying after 1980.107 This credit provides an "exemption equivalent" °8
of $175,625, transferable completely free of tax without use of any
marital deduction. °" Equalization of a married couple's estates or
transfer tax bases may cause the under-utilization of the available uni-
fied credit and result in aggregate transfer taxes higher than necessary.
Even where estate equalization does not prevent full utilization of
the available unified credit, absolute equalization nevertheless may fail
to achieve any overall tax or economic benefits. Several factors can
cause this result. For example, in taxable estates over $250,000 the nar-
rowest tax rate bracket is $250,000 in amount."' Given the broad
width of these brackets, in many instances the first spouse to die can
leave the survivor the maximum amount qualifying for the marital de-
duction, rather than only the amount necessary to equalize their tax
105. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2006(a), 90 Stat. 1879, 1880 (1976) (adding I.R.C. § 2602(c)(5)(A)).
For a general explanation of the generation-skipping transfer tax, see A. CASNER, supra note 32, at
29-40.
106. See Allington, How Interspousal Gfts, Marital Deductions Shape Estate Taxes on Succes-
sive Estates, 48 J. TAX. 284 (1978); Thomas, Esperti & Katz, New Variable Marital Deduction
Technique Eliminates Uncertainty in Estate Plans, 47 J. TAx. 194 (1977). See also Brode, Not
Maximizing the Marital Deduction in Certain Estates May Produce Higher Savings, 48 J. TAX. 148
(1978); Schnee, An Analysis of the Optimum Marital Deduction, 5 TAX ADVISOR 222 (1974).
107. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001(a)(2), 90 Stat. 1848 (1976) (adding I.R.C. § 2010).
108. The term "exemption equivalent" refers to the maximum dollar value that can be trans-
ferred without tax, due to the allowance of the credit with respect to the tax otherwise payable.
109. The $175,625 exemption equivalent is the estate value necessary to generate a pre-credit
tax of $47,000, assuming the decedent has made no taxable lifetime gifts. See generally I.R.C.
* 2001(c).
110. I.R.C. §2001(c).
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bases, and not thrust the survivor's estate into a higher bracket than the
decedent's. I "
Even if a higher bracket results, absolute equalization still may not
present the most beneficial alternative. If the surviving spouse's life
expectancy is great, substantial economic benefits may be achieved by
making a maximum marital deduction bequest, thereby reducing to a
minimum the estate taxes payable on the death of the first spouse to
die. The interest earned on the deferred taxes may more than compen-
sate for the increased taxes payable at the survivor's death. Addition-
ally, if the surviving spouse is expected to consume a significant portion
of the assets received from the decedent spouse, through living ex-
penses, annual gifts of less than $3,000 each among several donees," 2
or otherwise, then a maximum marital deduction bequest may also be
warranted.
Given the multiplicity and complexity of the foregoing factors, each
of which should be thoughtfully considered in any responsible estate
plan, the equalization clause generally is an unattractive estate plan-
ning alternative."13 After the Tax Reform Act of 1976, as clarified by
the Revenue Act of 1978,1 14 estate planners possess a more flexible tool;
the disclaimer.
Section 2045"1 provides that a person may make a valid disclaimer
of any interest in property within nine months of the transfer creating
the interest."16 As clarified by the Revenue Act of 1978, section
2045(b)(4) indicates that to qualify as a valid disclaimer, the interest
refused must pass without direction on the part of the person making
the disclaimer. The interest may pass to the decedent's spouse, how-
ever, even though the spouse is the person making the disclaimer.
17
Estate planners can achieve great flexibility in marital deduction
planning by coupling a maximum marital deduction bequest with a
provision directing the disposition of any portion of the bequest that is
validly disclaimed by the surviving spouse.1 8 The decedent's will may
111. See A. CASNER, sufpra note 32, at 130-33.
112. See I.R.C. § 2503.
113. See Thomas, Esperti & Katz, supra note 106, at 195.
114. Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 702(m)(1), 92 Stat. 2763, 2935 (1978) (amending I.R.C. § 2045).
115. I.R.C. § 2045.
116. Id.
117. Id See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 702(m), 92 Stat. 2935 (1978) (section
entitled "Disclaimer by Surviving Spouse Where Interest Passes to Such Spouse").
118. Prior to enactment of§ 2045, § 2056(d) governed the effect of disclaimers on the marital
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even direct that the amount disclaimed be placed in trust, giving the
surviving spouse a life income interest and a special power of appoint-
ment over the corpus.' 19 This estate plan allows the decedent to fully
provide for the economic sufficiency of the bequest to the surviving
spouse.
Furthermore, the marital bequest amount can reflect variables such
as the existing "estate" of the surviving spouse, the potential impact of
generation-skipping transfers, lifetime gifts, the unified credit, transfer
tax rate brackets, the life expectancy and economic needs of the surviv-
ing spouse, and the deferral value of estate taxes otherwise payable
currently. Through consideration of the situation existing at the dece-
dent's death, optimal use of the marital deduction may be accom-
plished. Upon determination of the optimal marital deduction amount,
the desired results can be easily achieved through an appropriate dis-
claimer by the surviving spouse in accordance with the provisions of
section 2045.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite judicial approval of equalization clauses with alternate valu-
ation, numerous factors indicate that estate planners should avoid the
equalization clause as a marital deduction planning technique. From
the single aspect of flexibility, the maximum bequest-disclaimer tool
constitutes an exceptionally attractive alternative. Furthermore, the le-
gal risks associated with the equalization clause are very great. The
Commissioner's nonacquiescence to Smith erects a significant practical
deduction. The federal tax consequences of an attempted disclaimer depended primarily on the
disclaimer's effectiveness under local law. Congress enacted the new disclaimer provisions to pro-
vide greater uniformity of treatment for purposes of the federal estate, gift, and generation-skip-
ping transfer taxes. H. REP. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66-67 (1976), reprinted in 1976-3
C.B. 800-01.
With the states' disparate treatment of disclaimers under prior law, estate planners devised unu-
sual testamentary provisions to allow the post-mortem marital deduction planning now possible
under the federal disclaimer rules. The judicial response to these unusual arrangements, often
involving the potential terminability of the interests created, injected substantial uncertainty into
their use. Compare Estate of Neugass v. Commissioner, 555 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1977) with Estate of
Mackie v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 308 (1975).
119. In general, a special power of appointment is a power exercisable in favor of a defined
class that does not include the surviving spouse, or the estate or creditors of the surviving spouse.
See Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(c)(1) (1958). The income interest obviously benefits the surviving
spouse financially, while the limitation of the power to a special power insures that the bequest
does not qualify for the marital deduction in the decedent's estate (see I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5)) and
also is not includible in the surviving spouse's estate (see I.R.C. § 2041(a)).
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barrier to effective use of the equalization clause, as the Commissioner
is likely to challenge any marital deduction generated by such a clause.
Finally, persuasive statutory and policy arguments support the conclu-
sion that equalization clause bequests are terminable interests under
section 2056(b)(1), so that rejection of the Smith line of cases not only
is warranted, but also presents a serious possibility.
Michael . Arri
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